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THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE: IN
FAVOR OF THE INSURER OR THE INSURED?
JUST v. LAND RECLAMATION, LTD.
155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570
(1990)
The comprehensive general liability policy (CGL) is the instrument
most often used to afford liability protection for commercial ventures.1
In the 1970s, the insurance industry added a clause to the CGL policy
to protect itself against the seemingly limitless fount of environmental
litigation.2 This clause excludes insurance coverage of damages arising
from pollution unless the discharges are "sudden and accidental."3 In-
1. Through such standardized contracts, insurers hoped to achieve uniformity of
coverage and of judicial interpretation. Bradbury, Original Intent, Revisionism, and the
Meaning of the CGL Policies, I EvrL. CLAIMS J. 279, 280 (1989). The basic indemni-
fication clause promises:
to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which
this insurance applies caused by an occurrence, and arising out of any other opera-
tion, activity, or use of property, real or personal, except an occurrence incident to
a non-business pursuit.
Tyler & Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in Interpretation and Applica-
tion Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17 IDAHo L. REv. 497, 498
(1981).
2. For a history of the pollution exclusion clause, see Note, The Pollution Exclusion
Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEo. L.J. 1237 (1987). Environmental liability
has become a leading legal problem in the field of insurance litigation, as evidenced by
the common law and statutory expansions of liability throughout the 1980s. This raises
in turn important questions of public policy centering on society's reliance on dangerous
technologies. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 942 (1988).
3. The standard pollution exclusion clause in a comprehensive general liability in-
surance policy (CGL) excludes from coverage:
[Blodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or
escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon
land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 742-43, 456 N.W.2d 570, 571-72
(1990) (emphasis in original; emphasis added).
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surers and insureds, however, differ in their interpretations of the
phrase "sudden and accidental" in coverage litigation.4 In Just v. Land
Reclamation, Ltd. ,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the phrase
"sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause means unex-
pected and unintended damage, permitting the insured coverage for
unexpected pollution damage that occurred over a substantial period of
time.6
In Just, homeowners alleged that Land Reclamation, Ltd. (LRL)
operated a landfill that was the source of unexpected and unintended
pollution causing them bodily injury and property damage.7 Pursuant
to a duty to defend clause, LRL's insurer, Bituminous Casualty Corpo-
ration (Bituminous), joined in LRL's defense but later withdrew and
denied coverage.' In its motion for summary judgment, Bituminous
claimed that the word "sudden"9 in the pollution exclusion clause
unambiguously signified "abrupt and immediate," and therefore the
4. Williams, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the Pollution Exclusion, 1
ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 323, 324 (1989). Advocates of insureds argue that the phrase "sud-
den and accidental" does not apply to gradual releases which the exclusion otherwise
precludes, so long as the insured did not expect or intend the damage. Insurers, by
contrast, argue that "sudden" means "quick" and that coverage extends only to releases
happening in a brief or abrupt time frame. Id.
5. 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990).
6. Id. at 738, 456 N.W.2d at 571. Other courts called upon to interpret the phrase
"sudden and accidental" have found it ambiguous and thus interpreted the exclusion in
favor of the insured. See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380
S.E.2d 686 (1989) (rejecting the contention that it merely repeated the definition of
"occurrence," the court explained that while "the pollution exclusion clause focuses on
whether the 'discharge, dispersal or release' of the pollutants is unexpected or unin-
tended, the definition of occurrence focuses on whether the property damage is unex-
pected and intended."); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co.,
180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 387, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting that interpret-
ing "sudden" to mean "abrupt" and "instantaneous" contravenes the insurance indus-
try's intent in adding the pollution exclusion clause to the CGL). But see American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan. 1987)
(rejecting the contention that the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous, the court
stated that "read as a whole, the policy covers 'continued and repeated exposure' except
for exposures to pollution; then it covers only 'sudden and accidental' events.").
7. Just, 155 Wis. 2d at 738, 456 N.W.2d at 572. Plaintiffs alleged that over the
course of time LRL operated the landfill negligently and in violation of federal, state
and local law, rules, ordinances and regulations, resulting in water contamination,
noise, dust, smells and blowing garbage. Id.
8. Id. at 740, 456 N.W.2d at 572.
9. Id. The insurance policy itself failed to explicitly define the meaning of the terms
"sudden and accidental." See supra note 3 for the pertinent language of the CGL
policy.
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damages did not come within the scope of the policy's coverage."° The
circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing Bituminous, and
LRL appealed. 1 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the pollu-
tion exclusion clause precluded LRL from coverage because nothing in
the record specifically set forth allegations of immediate discharge on a
specific date and time.12 On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded, holding that "sudden and accidental" is an am-
biguous term,' 3 which would not support exclusion from coverage for
unexpected and unintended pollution damage."4
10. Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd. 151 Wis. 2d 593, 445 N.W.2d 683 (Ct. App.
1989).
11. Id. at 603, 445 NW.2d at 687. In holding that LRL failed to meet its burden of
proving that the claims came within the coverage provision, the court stated "[t]hat
[because] pollution has occurred does not of itself raise a reasonable inference of a sud-
den discharge." Id. at 605, 445 N.W.2d at 688.
12. Just, 155 Wis. 2d at 738, 456 N.W.2d at 571.
13. The court found that dictionaries differ on the meaning of the term "sudden,"
thereby furthering the conclusion that the term is ambiguous:
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986) defines "sudden"
in a variety of different ways. Webster's first defines the term as "happening with-
out previous notice ... occurring unexpectedly [and] not foreseen." Only later
does Webster's define the word "sudden" in any sense of timeliness, listing the
synonyms "prompt" and "immediate." Id. In contrast, the RANDOM HOUSE DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987), first defines the word "sud-
den" in temporal terms as "happening, coming, made or done quickly."
Id. at 740, 456 N.W.2d at 573 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE 1900 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 2284 (1986)). The court noted that especially in exclusionary clauses,
ambiguous language must be construed against the party who drafted the ambiguous
language, here (as is usually the case) the insurer. Id. Therefore, the court defined
"sudden and accidental" to mean damages that are unexpected and unintended. Id.
This interpretation naturally favors insureds because insurers must indemnify for dam-
age resulting from continuous pollution. Id. at 738, 456 N.W.2d at 571.
14. Attorneys for the insurers argued without success that rules governing the con-
struction and interpretation of insurance policies required the state's supreme court to
uphold the lower courts' rulings:
[I]n interpreting insurance policies, the objective is to ascertain and carry out the
true intentions of the parties. In ascertaining the intention of the parties, a practi-
cal construction is the most persuasive. When language is plain and unambiguous,
the apparent import of the words must govern. In addition, it is fundamental that
no insurance contract be rewritten to bind an insurer to a risk which it did not
contemplate and for which it was not paid, unless the policy's terms are ambiguous
or obscure.
Brief of Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Respondent Bituminous Casualty Corporation
at 9, Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990) (No. 88-
1656) (citing Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 385-86, 344 N.W.2d
523, 527 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that if a condition is caused by accident, coverage is
1991]
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The first generation of CGL policies established insurers' indemnifi-
cation duties triggered by the occurrence of an "accident."' 5 In 1966,
the insurance industry revised the CGL policies to allow coverage for
an "occurrence." 16 An occurrence happens when damages arise from
an accident that is neither expected nor intended. 7 Although insurers
intended the occurrence definition to limit the scope of coverage,
courts construed the revision as broadening coverage.' 8 In an attempt
to achieve clarity, insurers most recently added the pollution exclusion
clause, under which they would cover only pollution-related losses that
arose from occurrences both "sudden and accidental."' 19
limited to injuries caused by a sudden and identifiable event with respect to both loca-
tion and time)).
15. See Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 1, at 499 (an "accident" may be defined as "a
distinctive event that takes place by some unexpected happening at a date that can be
fixed with reasonable certainty" (quoting 11 G. COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, § 44:283, at
700 (1963))). The term "accident" does not embrace gradual damage. Note, supra note
2, at 1242. See also Clark v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Am., 21 Wis. 2d 268,
283, 124 N.W.2d 29, 37 (1963) (where the damage results from a long, continuing nui-
sance condition and the insured fails over many months to take effective steps to abate
the nuisance, the damage is not "caused by accident" within the meaning of the insur-
ance contract).
16. Note, supra note 2, at 1246. The insurance industry changed its policy in re-
sponse to consumer demands for greater coverage, the uncertainty ofjudicial interpreta-
tions, and a trend toward judicially expanded coverage. Id.
17. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 1, at 499. The insurance industry interprets the
term occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to condi-
tions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured." Id. (citing Fish, An Overview of the 1973 Compre-
hensive General Liability Policy and Products Liability Coverage, 34 J. Mo. B. 257
(1978)).
18. Note, supra note 2, at 1248. "Coverage for pollution or contamination is not
provided in most cases under present [occurrence-based] policies because the damages
can be said to be expected or intended and thus are excluded by the definition of occur-
rence." Id. (quoting The Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau). The occurrence-based pol-
icies, however, eliminated the word "sudden" contained in previous accident-based
policies. With "suddenness" no longer a requirement, courts seized the opportunity to
expand coverage and denied coverage only if the losses were foreseeable. Id. See, e.g.,
Wilmington v. Pigott, 64 N.C. App. 587, 307 S.E.2d 857, 859 (Ct. App. 1983)
(" '[A]ccidental' means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intent or
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.").
19. Note, supra note 2, at 1252. By reintroducing the suddenness requirement, in-
surers hoped to cut back coverage from the broader definition of occurrence. Id. See
also Broadwell Realty v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 528 A.2d 76, 85
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). Holding that the "sudden and accidental" exception was
simply a restatement of the definition of "occurrence," the Broadwell court noted that
"the exclusion was designed to decrease claims for losses caused by expected or in-
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Because state law governs the interpretation of insurance contracts,
occasional inconsistencies arise among the states. The courts have var-
iously interpreted "sudden and accidental" within the pollution exclu-
sion clause as permitting or precluding coverage, given similar
"occurrences" involving pollution damage.2° One line of authority
holds that unintended and unexpected damages fall within the "sudden
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion clause.21 The
tended pollution by providing an incentive to industry to improve its manufacturing and
disposal processes." Id.
20. See generally Williams, supra note 4 for an overview of the ways courts have
traditionally interpreted the pollution exclusion clause and recent trends in
interpretations.
21. Two theories have been advanced under this rubric. Some courts have deter-
mined that "sudden and accidental" is another way of defining "occurrence." See, eg.,
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D.
Mich. 1988) (where policy defined occurrence as accident, including continuous re-
peated exposure, unexpected or unintended damage falls within the sudden and acciden-
tal exception to the pollution exclusion clause); Kipin Indus., Inc. v. American
Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 535 N.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1987) ("occur-
rence" not restricted to momentary event, but includes any event which causes unex-
pected or unintended damages); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, 34
Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262 (Ct. App. 1983) (pollution exclusion clause in liability
policy was meant to deprive active polluters, and simply restates the definition of "oc-
currence").
Other courts have found the phrase "sudden and accidental" ambiguous, and there-
fore construe the clause in favor of the insured. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987) (the word "sudden"
means an unexpected discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants); Claussen v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989) (courts construe the
term "sudden" in favor of insureds to mean "unexpected and unintended" because it
includes more than one meaning); United States Fidelty & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coat-
ings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ct. App. 1989) (interpretation of
liability policy in favor of insured appropriate if ambiguity arises in policy exclusion);
CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1984) (court views unexpected or unforeseen character of word "accident" as
used in insurance policy from standpoint of insured); Jackson Township Mun. Utils.
Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1982) (court must sustain coverage if a problem of interpretation in con-
struing policy exists); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 439
N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1981) (where terms of insurance policy are ambiguous, the
court must construe the policy most favorably to insured); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil
Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1980) (court should not limit term
"sudden" to an instantaneous happening and should construe ambiguous terms in favor
of insured); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1984) (court may find release of hazardous waste
materials generated by insured "sudden and accidental" absent any allegations that in-
sured intended or expected release of materials or damage).
19911
Washington University Open Scholarship
214 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 40:209
other line of authority interprets the phrase as having a temporal
meaning, allowing coverage only if the discharge is immediate.22
An early New York case interpreting the pollution exclusion clause
is Allstate Insurance Co. v. Klock Oil Co.23 In Klock Oil, a landowner
sued Klock Oil Company (Klock) for property damage caused by a
leaking gasoline storage tank.2" Klock sought to compel its insurer to
defend it in spite of the pollution exclusion clause.25 The court held
that the negligent installation or maintenance of the storage tank could
result in an accidental discharge or escape of gasoline which would be
both "sudden and accidental" though undetected for a substantial pe-
22. See, eg., FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.
1990) (court should give term "sudden" its plain everyday meaning, so as to impart a
temporal component); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856
F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988) (phrase "sudden and accidental" not ambiguous or a synonym
for unexpected and unintended); Ray Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp.
1310 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (contamination of a landfill continuously for approximately 13
years not "sudden and accidental" discharge and thus fell within pollution exclusion);
C.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp. 265 (D.
Mass. 1989) (slow and gradual discharge not a "sudden and accidental" discharge
within meaning of an exception to pollution exclusion); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-
Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ("sudden" not defined as unex-
pected and unintended, but includes a temporal aspect); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (term "sudden" not
restatement of definition of "occurrence," but a provision to limit coverage to accidents
distinct in time and place); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F.
Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987) (damages excluded from coverage where salt plant operator
knew of pollution for nearly 50 years); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
656 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (pollution exclusion clause not ambiguous and applied
to contamination that resulted from continuous dumping of toxic chemicals); Interna-
tional Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522
N.E.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1988) (term "sudden" means that resulting flow or dispersal of
pollutants occurred without notice, or on brief notice, abruptly or hastily, and not
merely unintended and unexpected); Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("sudden and
accidental" event is one which is unexpected, unintended, and occurs over short period
of time); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340
S.E.2d 374 (1986) ("sudden and accidental" exception requires event not only to be
unexpected, but to happen instantaneously); Lower Paxton Township v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (insured barred from recovery
where no contention that pollution was produced in an abrupt manner).
23. 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1980).
24. Id. at 487, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
25. Id. Allstate disclaimed coverage and refused to defend on the ground that the
pollution exclusion was applicable. Hurwitz & Kohane, The Love Canal-Insurance
Coverage for Environmental Accidents, 50 INS. COuNS. J. 378, 383 (1983).
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riod of time.26 The court explained that if the resulting damage were
found to be unintentional, the leak in question might constitute an acci-
dent,27 regardless of the period of time involved.
2 8
The New York courts expanded on the Klock Oil decision in Niag-
ara County v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. ,29 a case which arose out of
the Love Canal catastrophe.3 0 The court in Niagara County held the
insurer liable for the insured's defense costs, ruling the pollution exclu-
sion clause inapplicable where the insured's conduct was uninten-
tional.3" The court reasoned that where complaints merely alleged that
Niagara County negligently oversaw the Love Canal site,3 2 the allega-
tions fell outside the pollution exclusion; the clause contemplated
knowing pollution only. 3 Moreover, whether the contamination oc-
curred all-at-once or over a span of years was not dispositive. The rele-
vant inquiry focused on whether the insured expected or intended the
pollution and resulting damages to occur.3 4
Courts of other states have followed the New York decisions, inter-
preting the clause as permitting coverage on claims where the injury
was neither expected nor intended .3  For example, in Buckeye Union
26. Klock Oil, 73 A.D.2d at 487, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
27. The court focused on whether the damage was unexpected or unintended from
the viewpoint of the insured. Id.
28. Id. In so holding, the court ruled that the term "sudden" should not be limited
to an instantaneous happening. Id.
29. 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538, (Sup. Ct. 1981).
30. Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 25, at 380. Chemical companies used the aban-
doned canal as a waste disposal site for three decades. Id. In the 1950s, developers
covered the site with earth and built homes on the surrounding property. Id. In 1978,
the Commissioner of Health declared the existence of a health emergency. Id. As a
result, private litigants filed hundreds of lawsuits claiming personal injuries and prop-
erty damage. Id.
31. Niagara County, 80 A.D.2d at 420, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 542. The court found that
the exclusion should apply only to an "active polluter," as opposed to a party who is
liable because of the strict liability that attaches to the improper disposition of hazard-
ous materials under federal and state law. Pendygraft, Plews, Clark & Wright, Who
Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability and In-
surance Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REv. 117, 156 (1988).
32. Niagara County, 80 A.D.2d at 419, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 541. Plaintiffs alleged that
Niagara County negligently failed to warn its citizens and enforce its health regulations
by failing to remove the chemicals.
33. Id. at 420, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 541-42.
34. See Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 25, at 383.
35. See supra note 21 for a discussion of decisions relying on Niagara County and
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1980);
1991)
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Insurance Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chemicals Co. ,36 the State of Ohio
filed an action against Liberty Solvents for damages after hazardous
waste leaked into surface waters, soil and groundwater. 37 The court of
appeals ordered Buckeye to defend Liberty Solvents for the damage
claims.3 8 The court held that insurers must indemnify insureds on
claims for pollution-caused damages under liability insurance exclud-
ing coverage on such claims unless the pollution is "sudden and acci-
dental," where the damages were neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured.39 The court reasoned that because the
insurer did not allege that the insured intended or expected the release
of pollutants, the pollution exclusion clause did not preclude
coverage.4°
More recently, the Ohio Court of Appeals followed this interpreta-
tion in Kipin Industries, Inc. v. American Universal Insurance Co.41 As
a matter of statutory construction, the court stated that "the clause
must be construed strictly against the insurer because it is ambigu-
ous."'42 In holding against the insurer, the court went even further
cf. Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 141,
533 N.Y.2d 91, 100 (App. Div. 1988)(pollution exclusion clause excludes from coverage
all intentional discharges regardless of whether the consequential damages were in-
tended or unintended).
36. 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1984).
37. Id. at 129, 477 N.E.2d at 1229. The complaint alleged that generators of haz-
ardous waste contracted with a disposer who caused the soil and groundwater around
the disposal site to become contaminated by dropping and puncturing drums of waste.
Id.
38. Id. at 136, 477 N.E.2d at 1237. The court reached this conclusion even while
ruling that Buckeye Union may not owe Liberty Solvents a duty to indemnify. Id. The
duty to defend arose because one theory of recovery potentially fell within the policy
coverage, but the product hazard exclusion could relieve the insurer of its duty to in-
demnify. Id. The product hazard exclusion essentially excludes coverage on theories of
products liability. Id. at 135, 477 N.E.2d at 1236.
39. Id. at 134, 447 N.E.2d at 1235. The court construed the term "sudden and
accidental" most favorably to the insured and in accordance with other jurisdictions'
interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause. Id.
40. Id. at 133, 477 N.E.2d at 1234. The Buckeye court appeared to rule that so long
as a complaint fails to allege that the generator knew of the improprieties committed by
its disposer, the generator may seek indemnification from its insurer, even though the
discharge may have been far from sudden or accidental. See Note, supra note 2, at
1274-75.
41. 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 535 N.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1987). Kipin involved an in-
surer's refusal to defend an insured who had previously been found liable under the
Superfund Act for improper storage of hazardous waste. Id. at 229, 535 N.E.2d at 336.
42. Id. at 232, 535 N.E.2d at 338.
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than previous cases by stating that the insurance industry through the
clause "intended to clarify the definition of 'occurrence' so as to ex-
clude coverage for expected or intended results.",1 3
The above-referenced cases illustrate the problems the insurance in-
dustry faces with the interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause.' g
In brief, these decisions ignore the insurers' intent to limit liability by
holding that unexpected and unintended damages fall within the "sud-
den and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion clause.45
A newer line of cases views the phrase "sudden and accidental" as
having a temporal significance." The focus turns from the nature of
the damage, viz. sudden and accidental, to the nature of the release
causing the damages.4 7 These courts hold that coverage will be re-
stored under the exception to the pollution exclusion only when the
release occurred both quickly and accidentally.4" The courts first ap-
ply the traditional occurrence analysis to determine whether the losses
were unexpected or unintended.' Next, the courts apply a distinct
"sudden and accidental" analysis under the pollution exclusion to de-
termine whether the discharge falls within the exception to the
clause.50 Insurers under this analysis must provide coverage for "sud-
den and accidental" releases of pollution, but not for gradual or contin-
uous discharges.51
43. Id. The court cited the Insurance Rating Board for this linkage. Id. The term
"occurrence" appeared in the general indemnification clause, and was held to include an
event which "[took] place over a span of time." Id. at 231, 535 N.E.2d at 337.
44. See Note, supra note 2, at 1278 (insurers remain fundamentally concerned with
the problem that courts interpret their policies consistently).
45. Id. at 1253.




49. Note, supra note 2, at 1267. Because these courts interpret the term "sudden"
to mean instantaneous, the courts will bar coverage under the pollution exclusion even
if the losses are neither intended nor expected when the discharges are not instantane-
ous. See supra note 22 for a discussion of cases which follow this analysis.
50. Note, supra note 2, at 1267.
51. See, eg., Wagner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 609, 427 N.W.2d
854 (Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to exclude from coverage clean-up costs for sudden dam-
age to pipe and immediate, uninterrupted discharge of gasoline into sewer), rev'd, Just
v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990); see also Williams,
supra note 4, at 329-31 for a discussion of cases which follow this interpretation.
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
218 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 40:209
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc. 52 illus-
trates this view. In Star Fire Coals, a landowner alleged that he sus-
tained personal bodily injury and damage to his property by the
emission of excessive amounts of coal dust from Star Fire's coal tipple
during the course of its operation.53 Although the court assumed that
an "occurrence" did in fact take place,54 insurers would be under a
duty to indemnify only if the discharges were also "sudden and acci-
dental."55 The court held that the release of pollutants on a regular
basis was not "sudden" in the temporal sense56 and that, therefore, the
"sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion did not apply."
The court took pains to note that the focus of the "'sudden and acci-
dental' exception is on the nature of the discharge of the pollution it-
self, not on the nature of the damages caused."58
The Illinois Court of Appeals used a similar analysis in International
Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Jnsurance Co. (IMC)59
In IMC, the United States fied a complaint alleging that IMC violated
federal environmental statutes' by reason of activities which resulted
in environmental contamination at the company's barrel recondition-
52. 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988).
53. Id. at 32. The discharge took place over a seven to eight year period. Id.
54. Id. at 33. The court found that the term "occurrence" as defined in the insur-
ance policy did not have a temporal component and focused only on the insured's ex-
pectations regarding damages. Id. As a result, the court ruled that conditions which
took place over a significant period of time but which caused unexpected damage would
fall within the definition of an "occurrence." Id.
55. Id. at 34.
56. Id. at 34-35. The court stated that it could not define the term "sudden" "with-
out reference to a temporal element that joins together conceptually the immediate and
the unexpected." Id. at 34.
57. Id. at 35. The court concluded that the pollution exclusion clause precludes
coverage where the party discharged pollutants on an ongoing basis. Id.
58. Id. at 34. The court concluded that the ultimate issue before the court was not
whether the damage resulting from the discharges was unintended and unexpected, but
whether Star Fire's regular discharges over a seven to eight year period were "sudden
and accidental." Id. at 35.
59. 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1988).
60. Id. at 367, 522 N.E.2d at 762. The Government charged IMC with dumping
drums containing hazardous waste, resulting in contamination of the soil and ground
water. Id. The statutes implicated in the case included the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 § 7003 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1989) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 §§ 106-107 (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-9607 (1989).
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ing facility.61 The court held that the discharge of hazardous wastes
onto the ground clearly and unambiguously removed IMC from cover-
age by the terms of the pollution exclusion clause.62 The court ex-
plained that the comprehensive insurance provision grants coverage for
damage caused by an "occurrence," the sole criterion being whether
the insured intended or expected the damage.63 By contrast, the pollu-
tion exclusion clause focuses on the discharge." The court continued
that even if the damage constitutes an occurrence, the discharge must
be "sudden" in order to compel the insurer to provide coverage.65 In
so determining, the court reasoned that to interpret "sudden" as "unin-
tended and unexpected" would render it synonymous with "acciden-
tal," and thus mere surplusage." Moreover, the court interpreted the
word "sudden" to mean "happening without previous notice or with
very brief notice."67 The court accused previous courts of distorting
the meaning of the word "sudden" to achieve their desired result of
affording polluters insurance coverage.68
Until recently, Wisconsin courts have followed the minority view of
"sudden and accidental" advanced in the Star Fire Coals and IMC
cases.69 In City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp. '70 two neighbor-
61. 168 Ill. App. 3d at 365, 522 N.E.2d at 761.
62. Id. at 374-75, 522 N.E.2d at 767. The pollution exclusion clause precluded cov-
erage unless release of pollution was "sudden and accidental." Id. at 369, 522 N.E.2d at
763. Because the court found that the discharge of pollutants occurred over an ex-
tended period of time, the release could not be "sudden" and therefore fell within the
pollution exclusion clause. Id. at 374-75, 522 N.E.2d at 767.
63. Id. at 377, 522 N.E.2d at 768-69.
64. The pollution exclusion clause makes this clear by stating that the exclusion will
not apply "if such discharge, dispersal release or escape is sudden and accidental." Id.
at 369, 522 N.E.2d at 763 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 377, 522 N.E.2d at 768. To determine whether the pollution exclusion
clause governed, the court posed two questions. First, did the complaint allege a dis-
charge? Id. at 375, 522 N.E.2d at 767. Second, did the discharge result in pollution
damage? Id. The court answered both questions affirmatively and applied the pollution
exclusion clause. Id.
66. Id. at 378, 522 N.E.2d at 769. The court found that such a reading "does not
comport with fundamental rules of contract construction requiring that all words used
in a contract be given effect." Id.
67. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2284
(1976)).
68. Id. at 377-78, 522 N.E.2d at 768-69. See also Note, supra note 2, at 1240 (most
courts uniformly ignored the insurers' intent and misinterpreted the phrase "sudden
and accidental").
69. See, e.g., Wagner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 609, 618, 427
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ing cities brought action to recover for damage to their storm sewer
system caused by Allied's discharge of acid.71 The court concluded
that the exclusionary clause of the insurance policy applied because the
evidence refuted a conclusion that ongoing discharges were "sudden
and accidental."72
The court in State v. Mauthe73 followed Allied Smelting, holding
that the phrase "sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion
clause of Mauthe's liability insurance did not include damages occur-
ring over a long period of time.74 Although the court acknowledged
that the majority of jurisdictions had concluded to the contrary,75 it
recognized that the use of insurance to insulate industry from such
costs serves as a disincentive for companies to meet their environmen-
tal responsibilities.76 Given the inconsistencies of jurisdictions in defin-
ing "sudden and accidental," the Wisconsin Court of Appeals invited
the state supreme court to address the matter.
Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd. 77 presented the Wisconsin Supreme
Court with the opportunity to define "sudden and accidental" as found
N.W.2d 854, 858 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that pollution exclusion clause will not pre-
clude coverage where damage to property results from a continuous discharge of pollu-
tants over an extended period of time). But cf. State v. Mauthe, 142 Wis. 2d 620, 627,
419 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the term "sudden and accidental"
does not apply to pollution damage occurring over a substantial period of time); City of
Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 385-86, 344 N.W.2d 523, 527
(Ct. App. 1983)(holding that the pollution exclusion clause precludes coverage for inju-
ries incurred over a period of time).
70. 117 Wis. 2d 377, 344 N.W.2d 523 (Ct. App. 1983).
71. Id. at 380, 344 N.W.2d at 524.
72. Id. at 386, 344 N.W.2d at 527. The court relied on Clark v. London & Lanca-
shire Indem. Co. of Am., 21 Wis. 2d 268, 124 N.W.2d 29 (Wis. 1963) (holding that the
pollution exclusion clause precluded coverage where discharge occurred over an ex-
tended period of time).
73. 142 Wis. 2d 620, 416 N.W.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1987).
74. Id. at 626-27, 416 N.W.2d at 281. The court treated Allied Smelting as control-
ling authority. Id.
75. Id. at 627, 419 N.W.2d at 281-82. In refusing to follow the majority's view-
point, the court invited the Wisconsin Supreme Court to address the issue. Id. at 628,
416 N.W.2d at 282.
76. Id. The court acknowledged that insurance removes accountability from com-
panies for their conduct because the companies do not directly bear the costs for repair-
ing environmental damage. Id. Note that to the extent that the Mauthe decision turns
on such questions of policy, it suffers from the same infirmity as outcome-driven hold-
ings to the contrary. See supra note 68.
77. 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990).
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in the pollution exclusion clause. The court rejected prior Wisconsin
interpretations of the phrase7 8 and decided instead to follow the major-
ity definition.7 9 The court interpreted the phrase "sudden and acciden-
tal" to mean unexpected and unintended, thus permitting coverage
even though the damage occurred over a substantial period of time.80
The court therefore required Bituminous to defend LRL, finding the
damages to be neither expected nor intended.8"
The court determined that the majority conclusion "comports with
substantial evidence indicating that the insurance industry itself origi-
nally intended the phrase to be construed in this fashion." 2 The court
also noted that while the exclusion clause clarified the definition of oc-
currence as excluding expected or intended damages, it did not reduce
the scope of coverage.8 3 Thus, while the clause denied coverage to in-
tentional polluters, it continued to cover accidents.84
In dissent, Judge Steinmetz stated that the majority's interpretation
provided insurance coverage where no such coverage was contem-
plated. 5 The dissent emphasized that the court's decision takes away
from dump site owners the incentive to operate with care. 86 The dis-
sent also stated that the term "sudden" necessarily involves a temporal
78. Id. at 747, 456 N.W.2d at 579 (overruling Wagner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co.,
145 Wis. 2d 631, 426 N.W.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Mauthe, 142 Wis. 2d 620,
419 N.W.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1987)); City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 117
Wis. 2d 377, 344 N.W.2d 523 (Ct. App. 1983).
79. Id. The court found the phrase ambiguous. Id.
80. Id. at 740, 456 N.W.2d at 573.
81. Id. In the court's view, the allegations in the complaint raised inferences that
could support a recovery covered by the policy.
82. Id. See also id. at 742, 456 N.W.2d at 575 (contemporaneous statements by the
insurance industry-wide organization that drafted the clause make clear that the clause
was intended to clarify the occurrence definition and to exclude coverage of pollution-
related damage only if the damage is expected or intended by the insured (citing Price,
Evidence Supporting Policy Holders in Insurance Coverage Disputes, 3 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T. 17, 48 (1988))).
83. Id. The court found its interpretation consistent with the Insurance Rating
Board's suggestion that the pollution exclusion clause was intended to exclude only
intentional acts of pollution and would have no impact on the vast majority of risks. Id.
84. Id. (citing Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1573
(S.D. Ga. 1987)).
85. Id. at 747, 456 N.W.2d at 579 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting). The dissent argued
that the policy will become "a deep pocket to pay for business mistakes." Id.
86. Id. The dissent stated that insurers must cover all negligently caused damages,
even though pollution discharges from a landfill site might be expected. Id.
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element.87 Moreover, it noted that interpreting "sudden and acciden-
tal" to mean unexpected and unintended, would render the term "sud-,
den" meaningless.88 The dissent concluded that the pollution
exclusion required the discharge to be both "sudden" and "accidental"
in order to afford coverage.89 Therefore, the dissent would follow the
earlier Wisconsin decisions holding that the exception to the pollution
exclusion clause does not provide coverage for continuous and repeated
exposure.90 Under this analysis, Bituminous would have had no duty
to defend the suit against LRL.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Just was incorrect for
two reasons. First, the court improperly defined the term "sudden" in
the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion
clause.9" By holding that "sudden and accidental" means unexpected
and unintended, the court simply defined it as synonymous with "oc-
currence."9 2 Because an "occurrence" encompasses gradual or contin-
uous discharges, the Just court wrongly disregards the temporal
significance of the word "sudden."93 The better-reasoned view in IMC
posits a two-part test to be applied in the determination of coverage,
94
which accounts for both the terms "occurrence" and "sudden and ac-
cidental" in the comprehensive general liability policy. Even if the pol-
lution constitutes an occurrence, the discharges must also be
87. Id. at 750, 456 N.W.2d at 581.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 747, 456 N.W.2d at 579. The dissent reached this conclusion by finding
the term "sudden" to be connected by the conjunction "and" to the term "accidental,"
while stressing that the majority's definition renders the word "sudden" meaningless.
Id. In contrast with the majority, the dissent found that "the phrase 'sudden and acci-
dental' is unambiguous." Id. at 750, 456 N.W.2d at 581.
90. Id.
91. See Abraham, supra note 2, at 963 (the phrase "sudden and accidental" has
been "interpreted as a mere elaboration of the phrase 'neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured' in the definition of insured occurrences").
92. See Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 383 Pa.
Super. 558, 577, 557 A.2d 393, 402 (Super. Ct. 1989) (reading the term "sudden and
accidental" to mean only unexpected and unintended rewrites the policy and excludes
an important coverage requirement - "abruptness of the pollution discharge").
93. Id. The Paxton court stated that any interpretation other than its own would be
unreasonable because the insurance industry never would have devised the pollution
exclusion clause if it merely reiterated the definition of "occurrence." Id.
94. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text for discussion of International
Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 246
(Ct. App. 1988) (the release of pollutants must occur abruptly to constitute "sudden"
events).
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immediate to require an insurer to defend a damage claim or provide
indemnification.95
Second, the court misconstrued the intent of the insurance industry
to limit the ever-increasing scope of liability for environmental pollu-
tion damages.9 6 The court's redefinition of the exclusion clause allows
coverage in most instances.97 Knowing this, insureds can intentionally
pollute while claiming that the consequences were unintended. There-
fore, the insurer is forced to pay for the insured's environmental
irresponsibility."
The Just court takes a step backwards from the nascent judicial rec-
ognition of the need to protect the environment.99 By allowing cover-
age in instances where the damage is neither unexpected nor
unintended, the court unwittingly gives industry a license to pollute.
Burdened by growing environmental damage costs, insurers may cease
to issue insurance policies to businesses which pollute regularly, thus
undermining the nation's efforts to clean up after itself."°
Amy L. Fisher*
95. See supra notes 46-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases which
follow this thinking.
96. See Note, supra note 2, at 1252.
97. See, e.g., IMC, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 372, 522 N.E.2d at 765 (the "occurrence"
definition standing alone will cover any unintended damage whether or not the event
takes place gradually or instantaneously, rendering the class of events which qualify for
coverage potentially unlimited); see supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text for fur-
ther discussion of IMC.
98. See Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688,
697-98, 340 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1986) (placing the financial responsibility for pollution
that may occur over an extended time upon the insured "places the responsibility to
guard against such occurrences upon the party with the most control over the circum-
stances most likely to cause the pollution").
99. See, e.g., Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d
124, 143, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 103 (App. Div. 1988) (the court recognized that two legiti-
mate competing public policy concerns exist - the need to protect the environment and
the need to provide financial compensation for persons suffering from damages caused
by pollution); see also Note, supra note 2, at 1280-81:
The judiciary's reach into the deep pockets of the insurance industry to compensate
blameless victims of environmentally related losses has backfired. The result of
compensating isolated victims has been to inject uncertainty into the pollution ex-
clusion analysis. The indirect result has been to create an expanding class of vic-
tims while toxic waste cleanup crews and fully functional disposal sites stand idle
for want of insurance.
Id.
100. See id. at 1278 (responding to judicially imposed costs of cleaning up the envi-
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ronment, insurers have refused to furnish coverage, hindering an already sluggish envi-
ronmental cleanup effort).
* J.D. 1992, Washington University.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol40/iss1/12
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol40/iss1/12
